A Heideggerian analysis in the teaching of science to Maori students

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Abstract: Teachers frequently find that their teaching is unsuccessful with a particular group of students. This paper describes how Heidegger's ontology was useful to teachers as they developed a distance education platform to teach astronomy to culturally diverse Aotearoa New Zealand secondary school students. Māori students do not perform well within their State's model of normalising education, and academic authors ascribe this "failure" to the effects of cultural difference and imperialism. This paper conjectures that Māori are not merely "culturally different" but that they represent a metaphysical heritage that is akin to that described as Greek metaphysics by Heidegger. There are cultural artefacts and practices that serve for modern Māori in a way that parallels Heidegger's account of the ancient Greeks. Māori may represent an ontological tradition that stands completely outside of Western metaphysics. If the conjecture is correct, normalising education is unlikely to ever to be satisfactory for Māori.

Introduction - A cause for reflection

This paper describes the deliberations of teachers who taught astronomy online for the National Observatory of New Zealand, the Carter Observatory. Experienced teachers found they were challenged as they taught using a new delivery mode. All teaching and assessment was undertaken on the internet, and there was no other form of interaction with the students. The web site for this had been specifically constructed to facilitate the learning of students who had experienced difficulties in more 'traditional' learning environments. It was designed to maintain the students' attention and focus by providing rapid responses to student submissions and by providing positive reinforcement. Elsewhere the project itself and the delivery mode are described further (Shaw, 2004; Shaw, 2007).

Teachers typically teach those students who appear before them in classes. They know something about the student population in their institution and they try to construct programmes that address the needs of groups. In the project described below, when the teachers began to build the teaching website www.carterobservatory.net, they thought that they were in a similar position and targeted the less academic students in an effort to interest them in science and technology. Those who funded the project intended that the course produced promoted science and technology to underachieving students. However, the online system offered free courses to all Aotearoa New Zealand secondary school students who wished to gain credits on the Government's National Qualifications Framework. Accordingly, the course was available to everyone, with 350 students participating in the first year. They came from a cohort of about 45,000 students in year 11 at secondary schools (Shaw, 2004b).
The students stated their interests and revealed their language skills as they worked online. Consequently, the teachers began to think about the different groups of students that emerged. Some were young high-achievers with an established enthusiasm for astronomy. Others would have taken any course that was on the internet.

One group tended not to persevere with the course – they answered fewer questions in a session, and they did not log back into the site as reliably as other students. Teachers discovered that many in this group were Māori students. The students’ schools had enrolled them in the online course and supported them in their work, but all to no avail. This caused the online teachers to puzzle afresh over cultural differences in relation to schooling.

**Heidegger and education**

There is debate about the potential of Heidegger’s work to inform educational thinking and practice. Some theorists argue that Heidegger’s foundational theory of human beings could guide a wholesale reformation of schooling and education. The seminal paper, *Education in a Destitute Time* (A Heideggerian approach to the problem of education in the age of modern technology), sets the agenda for this discussion (Bonnett, 1983). Bonnett contrasts the Heideggerian approach to education to the liberal/rationalist tradition (Plato to R S Peters and Hirst) and to the humanistic Marxian tradition. One aspect of this compendious discussion inevitably relates to the concept of cultural difference.

Cooper is another writer who argues that Heidegger’s philosophy as a whole can assist our understanding of education. He says that educationalists will be helpfully informed by Heidegger’s “way of looking at the world” and his philosophy as a whole, both as a perspective in itself and also because of the more full understanding of specific ideas that such a perspective may bring (Cooper, 2002, p. 47). Hogan elaborates on where to find the potential in Heidegger’s thinking to inform education. For him it is in Heidegger’s difference from “what the dominant modes and tempers in Western philosophy have furnished for thought and action” (Hogan, 2002, p. 211).

Several theorists consider how Heidegger might provide a “positive vision for the future of higher education” (Cooper, 2002, p. 47) by understanding our educational crisis ‘ontohistorically’ (Thomson, 2001). For instance Gur-Ze’ev says that the “philosophy of Martin Heidegger is of much relevance for the elaboration of an attempt to open the gate to counter-education as an open possibility” (Gur-Ze’ev, 2002, p. 67), while Bonnett explores how Heidegger contributes to our understanding of learning itself and a “full educational relationship between learner and teacher” (Bonnett, 2002, p. 230).

Others with an interest in the relevance of Heidegger to education seek to apply aspects of this work to specific practical challenges within normalising education. Normalising education is that process whereby schooling produces an efficient orientation of students towards the given order of things, and so allows security, belonging and ultimately social progress (Gur-Ze’ev in the introduction to Gur-Ze’ev, 2000).

Several authors, working within the broad context of normalising education, have used Heideggerian theory to improve thought and action in curriculum and classroom challenges. For example, Mansfield (2005; 2003) applies the notion of *poiesis*, and the saving power of art, to examine students, schools as sites, and the music curriculum. Lambeir (2002) considers information technology in schools. Pike (2003) examines the ontological and primordial
significance of Being in English teaching. Lines (2005) applies Heidegger’s philosophy of art to argue for a new conception of music education that makes music responsible to changing ‘modes of beings’ in the moment. Waddington (2005) asks that we provide in such discussions a rigorous systematic evaluation of Heidegger but others are more concerned just to use what Heidegger provides as a tool.

The website www.carterobservatory.net is an example of normalising education and its development demonstrates a process whereby a State’s education apparatus adjusts to perceived problems in science education. To seek advancement from Heidegger’s thinking in the narrow context of distance education in astronomy may seem perverse when Gur-Ze’ev concludes “… Heidegger makes no effort to contribute to normalizing education … nor can he contribute, as some scholars would suggest, to the improvement of schooling …” (Gur-Ze’ev, 2002, p. 75).

Contra Gur-Ze’ev, and consistent with the aspirations of other theorists as indicated above, we show in this paper that Heidegger can generate new insights into normalising education, although ultimately these very insights take us back to Bonnett and the wider implications of Heidegger’s account of ontology and metaphysics.

Heidegger’s thought has been related to a concept that is central to current debates about Māori education. From within Heidegger’s theory of Dasein, it has been noticed that his concept of Ereignis is constructed in a manner mirrored in the Māori concept of ‘kaitiakitanga’. The meaning of this Māori word is complex and embedded in the Māori language. It is sufficient here to note that it refers to a particular form of interaction between the spiritual world, the natural world, and human beings. As Engels-Schwarzpaul says:

In Heidegger’s thinking, the experience of partaking in the disclosure of world is continuously invoked in differences that are dynamic. Thus, the Ereignis contains a reciprocal movement of ‘thrownness’ and ‘projection’, of ‘give-and-take’, and ‘belonging-and-needing’ (Sheehan, 2000, 2002). In this, his is not dissimilar to a Māori worldview with its emphasis on kaitiakitanga – receiving and active caring for what has been given, and the responsibility of handing it on to the next generation. (Engels-Schwarzpaul, 2003, p. 37).

Heidegger’s Greeks

The performance of Māori students on the website resulted in their being identified as a group which was eventually dubbed as ‘Heidegger’s Greeks’. When they designed the instructional facility, the teachers described the students this way:

… We see these students as the strugglers in schools, perhaps easily distracted from their work, and often with an enormous need to achieve. We see them in schools bombarded with images and movement, distracted easily by this movement, and distracted by their friends, and we see that they struggle to get the attention they need from teachers and parents (Shaw, 2004a, p. 4).

The teachers said that the internet-based facility proposed for these students would: “focus students on their own self-interest, show students the relevance of the learning to their self-interest, hold students attention - cut out distractions, integrate assessment with learning …, give students
personal attention…” (Shaw, 2004a, p. 5). The pedagogy was also described at that time: “We called this approach to teaching ‘black hole pedagogy’: once a student enters to a certain point in the system, they cannot escape, they cannot see outside of the system, they are drawn into the system, helplessly propelled onwards, until there is an inevitable conclusion. The conclusion is success for the student and their release from the system” (Shaw, 2004a, pp. 6-7). This is a violent application of normalising pedagogy and it is consistent with a relationship between national industrial needs and education that demonstrates itself in the West, including in Heidegger’s homeland (Biermans, De Jong, van Leeuwen, & Roeleveld, 2005; Hass, 2005).

‘Heidegger’s Greeks’ gave the project team a practical demonstration of the difficulty of teaching Māori students that is well known. In 1986, the Waitangi Tribunal brought down its findings about te reo Māori (the Māori language):

The education system in New Zealand is operating unsuccessfully because too many Māori children are not reaching an acceptable standard of education. For some reason they do not, or cannot, take full advantage of it. … Their scholastic achievements fall far short of what they should be…Judged by the system’s own standards Māori children are not being successfully taught … (6.3.8 in New Zealand Waitangi Tribunal & Durie, 2003).

The many reasons advanced to account for the differentiated educational achievement of Māori have loosely clustered around the themes of socio-economic disparity, cultural difference, and the socio-historical effects of colonisation.

Durie, for example, developed four cultural identity profiles to determine the role of cultural identity in successful educational outcomes. At the heart of the project is “the question of identity and the relationships between home and place, vocational migration and a retention of cultural identity while crossing cultural borders” (Durie, 1999, p. 2). Both socio-economic and cultural factors feature in one account of the differences between Māori and other children regarding literacy (Phillips, McNaughton, & MacDonald, 2004, pp. 309-310). Brell focuses on the effects of “intense colonisation” and policy initiatives to overcome such effects (Brell, 2000). He emphasises the need within Government to have a “good understanding of the causes, the dynamics, and incentives” in play before they establish programmes to address underachievement (Brell, 2000, p. 249). The intransigence of thinking about the role of culture in education was felt by Jones who says, “It has become difficult these days in education to think outside the frame of inequality…. It has become particularly difficult to think about Māori and Pakeha as categories, or as ‘related’ groups, in education, outside this limited, but compelling frame” (Jones, 2005, p. 9).

Such socio-economic and socio-historical accounts of Māori underachievement, have an easy relationship to the notion of culture-as-identity in modernity and the present age, and accordingly associate themselves with the idea of static differentiated groups (Eagleton, 2000). These accounts encourage us to objectify culture and make it malleable. “The cultural is what we can change, but the stuff to be altered has its own autonomous existence …” and part of that ability to change culture derives from its involving the following of rules and the freedom we have to alter rules (Eagleton, 2000, p. 4). This concept of culture allows, or facilitates, political appropriation, even though Eagleton warns culture is difficult to change.
Culture and ontology

The idea of culture comes from nature. “The earthly work of ‘cultivating’ – tending to crops or toiling the soil – was extended to the nature of the human being and the educative work that could be done to develop a ‘fine’ human nature” (Lines, 2003, p. 170). In this thought, we can see the genesis of the concept of ‘culture-as-identity’.

Heidegger asks us to look beyond the concept of ‘culture-as-identity’ and to relate culture/heritage to “primordial understanding” which is superior to the average everyday understanding which he explains by considering “idle talk” or chatter. ‘Heritage’ is in Being and Time the translated word for his sense of ‘culture’ (Young, 2002, pp. 32-33):

... we understand Dasein’s historizing in Being-with Others. In repetition, fateful destiny can be disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us. By repetition, Dasein first has its own history made manifest. Historizing is itself grounded ...(Heidegger, 1962, p. 438).

Here then culture (in the sense of form of life) and language are closer to the essence of being than anything biological. Coming from the Latin cultura, Heidegger thinks culture implies cultivation particularly self-cultivation (Young, 2002, p. 31). Heidegger relates culture to being, identity, and thinking - Identity and Difference begins: “The claim of identity speaks out of the Being of beings. However, where the Being of beings comes in Occidental thinking earliest and properly to language, namely with Parmenides, it says to auto, the identical, in an almost excessive sense. One of the sayings of Parmenides reads: to gar auto noein estin te kai eainai. ‘That, namely [the] same, is both becoming-aware (that is, thinking) and Being” (Heidegger, 1974, p. 27).

In Chapter V of Being and Time, Temporality and Historicality, Heidegger speaks about what we might today call the ‘cultural group’ or ‘ethnicity’. Historical epochs of a culture contain a mainstream world-interpretation and it is that which defines the epoch. Heidegger, with regard to his notion that history is ‘derivation’ (Herkunft, as opposed to an account of the past can you explain this please): “What ‘has a history’ in this way can, at the same time, ‘make’ such history. As ‘epoch-making’, it determines ‘a future’ ‘in the present’. Here ‘history’ signifies a ‘context’ of events and ‘effects’, which draws on through ...” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 430). Additionally, according to Young, there are sub-communities that represent anticipations of future states of the culture or remnants of past states. “Western modernity resembles a river. In the centre of the stream is the main current. But at the edges are small eddied and tributaries which move at a different pace and sometimes in a contrary direction” (Young, 2002, p. 126). Dreyfus elaborates on this in his account of ‘falling’ where he sets out Heidegger’s “three-fold distinction concerning the concealing and revealing possibilities of the one” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 328). A third kind of possibilities found in society are marginal practices that have resisted leveling. These can be practices that were central in past epochs ...” (Dreyfus, 1991, p. 329).

The online teachers did not find helpful the plethora of theories regarding Māori achievement in normalising education. Accordingly, they came to consider Heidegger’s ontological-metaphysical theory. Māori appeared to exhibit marginal practices that were resisting levelling, and Heidegger’s account of culture embraced (and perhaps potentially accounted for) the theories of empirical researchers.
The teachers’ conjecture was that Māori are ontologically unique. Māori do not share with Pakeha (white) New Zealanders the Western space of productionist metaphysics, although they occupy the same geographic and temporal space as Pakeha New Zealanders. In a productionist metaphysics all things appear as formed matter. (“Productionist metaphysics” is a term coined by Zimmerman, 1990, p. 157). Māori have a distinctive, practiced culture – founded upon a distinct metaphysics - that moves at a different pace, and in a contrary direction, to the cultures within the rest of Aotearoa New Zealand that are essentially (from their metaphysics) Roman. Pakeha New Zealand reflects Heidegger’s lament about nihilism: “Sometimes it seems as if modern humanity is rushing headlong toward this goal of producing itself technologically” (Heidegger, 1998, p. 197).

Māori ontology

It is informative to compare Heidegger’s description of the Ancient Greeks with Māori today. We do not suggest that the Ancient Greeks and Māori share the same metaphysics. However artefacts and practices identified by Heidegger as significant in relation to Greek metaphysics happen to have Māori surrogates. These markers, or preliminary indicators, of metaphysics sometimes stand in contrast to Pakeha community practices. They are indicative that there may be two ways of being within the same geographical living space, Aotearoa New Zealand.

It is convenient to consider the evidence around two Heideggerian motifs: (a) gods/holy places as expressed by marae, landscape, carving, and community procedures; (b) festivals that convey metaphysical authenticity with the example being the modern tangihana (funeral). Marae are areas of land with a meetinghouse, and associated support buildings, around which Māori communities gather. The communities are traditionally based upon ancestral groupings and kinship (Auckland City Council, 2004; Whitmore, 2005).

In Heidegger’s deliberations, the presence of gods as world-defining radiance is the essence of being as mystical, awesome and holy. ‘Essence’ here is used in the Heideggerian sense of ‘whatness’. Young cites three sources where Heidegger makes this explicit (Young, 2002, p. 22). He concludes “Being, to be brief and blunt, is God” (p. 22), which is a poets god to be venerated and not a god of dogma. The presence of gods requires (in Heidegger’s terms) that the community has appropriated gods, which means these gods shape the culture as a whole. The gods mediate through the culture in a multiplicity of ways and shape the lives of both the individuals who, and the institutions that, belong to the culture.

Marae “open up” a plethora of meanings, possibilities, and ways of being for individuals, and accordingly, we claim, perform the same broad role that Heidegger claims was performed by the temple at Paestum or the Bamberg Cathedral (Young, 2001, pp. 18-19). The role is to bring the past to the present, to have it ‘present-at-hand’ and thus to allow it to do its work today. Speaking of the remains of a Greek temple Heidegger says “... it can still be present-at-hand ‘now’-for instance, the remains of a Greek temple. With the temple, a ‘bit of the past’ is still ‘in the present’” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 430). There is mystery, reverential respect, a sense of their being a holy place, and awe generated by the marae as place and space, and the special language of the marae. This language is about the marae itself, including the history of the people of the marae, and the way of life associated with the marae. The recent power of marae is expressed in the Māori renaissance.
that has shown itself most strongly over the last two decades (Marshall, 1999; Webster, 1998).

When he discusses the loss of gods, Young (2002, p. 35) claims the radiance of the gods that stirs and inspires people regarding landscape resides in Polynesian and Aboriginal culture. Māori concepts of landscape, land ownership, and guardianship, are asserting themselves in Aotearoa New Zealand (Kedgley & Porirua Museum, 2002; King, 1985; Rei & Young, 1991).

There is the revival in carving and in the role of carving at the marae. Young (2001, p. 20) presents the example of the American Indian totem and its loss of world-disclosing power because of its removal to a museum, but in the case of Māori the reverse process is occurring – meaningful artefacts are gathering together either by recreation or by re-appropriation.

We may be able to draw further evidence of the respect, awe, and cultural significance that pertains to community, by considering how Māori in different situations proceed. One example in education is the approach to development projects as was exemplified in the project Te Reo O Te Taitokerau where a “guiding statement” had to be repeatedly redeveloped as a mechanism to bring the community to an understanding of purpose and commitment. This was a simple vehicle that brought those involved back to the uniquely Māori foundations of the project which was nevertheless something that began in a non-Māori context (Marshall & Peters, 1989; Peters & Marshall, 1988; Peters, Marshall, Para, & Shaw, 1989; Shaw & Ohia, 1988). Another example is the establishment of rituals before taking anything from the natural environment, a practice that links awe, cultural significance, environmental concerns, and Gods. “The rituals are supposed to make sure that the natural world is cared for and respected … thus the rituals can be seen as a form of payment or utu to the atua or gods concerned. The idea of utu or reciprocity is intimately connected with considerations of mana …” (Patterson, 2000, pp. 50-51).

Heidegger (1993) elaborates on the Greek ‘festival’ in The Origin of the Work of Art because it is an example of how the Greeks could remove themselves from ‘everydayness’ and ontologically become authentic. The ability to do this has been lost in modernity (because of the role of technology and its conversion of beings to industrial standing-reserve/resources) and thus Western people are denied the opportunity to refresh themselves through the festive mode of disclosure (with the possible exception of some poets in particular circumstances). What Heidegger says about the Greek festival relates closely to the Māori tangihana (funeral service of several days duration, for a definition, see Auckland City Council, 2004). For Māori, their cultural responsibility takes precedence over everything else and a tangihana may take about four days. These events relate closely to Heidegger’s description of the Greek festival. The important part in both instances is the opportunity that they accord participants to occasionally step outside of the daily ontological framework and to thus be for a time authentic. Heidegger says, in On the Essence of Truth, that occasional ontological refreshment will occur from time-to-time and not on a schedule. It is in this that we may see the importance of the festival, although Heidegger does not specifically mention festivals in his most revealing paragraph (Heidegger, 1993).

**Remnants, ontological rivers, and deep history**

When Young presents the river analogy for culture, he is arguing that there is some form of continuity between cultural tributaries. Something somehow displays change, nevertheless this something also holds to an underlying
unity and continuity. Toulmin sets out a mechanism that might be used to account for cultural change, difference, and continuity in his account of conceptual change though the application of the general model of evolution (Toulmin, 1972). His mechanism is a consistent account that applies to shared practices as much as to technological artefacts and scientific ideas. However, Young’s claim is that the ontology of Beings is the grounding of the fundamental difference between cultures, and we may ponder how this difference relates to his river analogy. Instinctively, we think of ontology as bedrock, foundational, or first- and ever-present. The bedrock determines the direction and flow of the river.

Rather than taking Young's lead and its eventual, inevitable, commitment to an evolutionary mechanism, it may be more fruitful to ask the prior question: How can we today establish the nature of Māori ontology? What, (incongruously, in ontic terms) might be the evidence? Heidegger asked a similar question about Ancient Greek ontology and devised a method to address his question. It is Heidegger’s method of deep history.

Firstly, some legitimation, and a warning, has been issued regarding such a project: “The ontological orders of Māori knowledge are not obvious; and in seeking to begin to understand maatauranga, a Western epistemology cannot be presupposed” (Salmond, 1985, p. 260).

Heidegger’s method of history builds upon a distinction that is important for Heidegger and which shows in German as being between Historie and Geschichte (Heidegger, 1962, p. 30). Historie is the sequence of events and facts as revealed in historiography or historiology, which Rée (1999, p. 48) calls the “mere chronicle of an inert past - an unfolding sequence of unambiguous realities that are now over and done with”. It has been translated to the “science of history” (footnote in Heidegger, 1962, p. 30).

Geschichte refers to the most profound historical changes that open up a space in which human beings subsequently exist. The profundness of Geschichte may be seen in Heidegger’s opinion that in the history of the West there have only been a few changes and they constitute the founding of epochs. The present paper refers to this notion in relation to Heidegger’s account of culture. It has been translated as “the kind of ‘history’ that actually happens” (footnote in Heidegger, 1962, p. 30).

In order to gleam information about Ancient Greek ontology, Heidegger examined early writers, not to consider their personal views, but to bring forward the ontological foundations of the times. He would often focus on particular words and take a broad, contextual, lived-world, view of them. The words examined in this way were somehow made indicative of metaphysics and sometimes symbolic of a particular metaphysics. Through this work, he was able to construct his view about the metaphysical world that the authors inhabited.

To use this technique in relation to Māori is an intriguing possibility. Where Heidegger considered written fragments, the Māori project would consider oral traditions. Any project would need to be executed in te reo Māori because as Salmond notes about the understanding of Māori concepts, the “reasonableness of maatauranga rests within Māori language, and not in the partialities of translation ...” (Salmond, 1985, p. 260). Whilst Heidegger sought a metaphysics that was extant over two centuries ago, the Māori project could well be about a single metaphysics that may have flourished for over a thousand years. There is an historical consistency in the Polynesian oral tradition that has been tracked through six categories of words (Taonui, 2006).
Salmond considers several words that might reveal something of the deep history of Māori. She devotes nine pages to “waananga” and provides associations and linkages from that word to cosmology, nature, holiness, sacredness, genealogy, power in a range of contexts and senses, and a spatial-temporal world. “In this conception of the universe, men and women existed at a threshold or pae between sky and earth, life and death, light and dark, and exerted themselves to influence destiny” (Salmond, 1985, p. 241). This complexity and richness suggests that it may be possible to construct the Māori ontology of pre-European times, and that that ontology may be present today. It is likely such research would demonstrate a contrast between Māori ontology and Western productionist metaphysics, and the Western presupposition of formed matter in a particulate world.

**Implications for those within normalising education**

Heidegger’s thinking assisted the online astronomy teachers in their conventional educational development project in several ways. Situated as it was within the state schooling system, the project was an example of normalising education and the teaching technology produced was inherently violent. However, a more fundamental and grounding idea emerged when the teachers considered the performance of Māori students in that system.

Our conjecture is that socio-economic disparity, cultural difference, and colonisation, are factors in the situation because Māori are ontologically distinct from the colonising Europeans.

The notion of ‘under-achievement’ comes from the notion of achievement. Achievement emerges from a totality. Achievement is a remarkably broad notion, and schools measure but small aspects (or alleged surrogates) of the totality. The complexity and diversity of the reasons advanced to ‘explain’ under-achievement, all with a measure of validity within the horizon of normalising education, point us towards the idea that there is something more fundamental which originates the totality. In Heidegger’s terms what emerges from such a totality is the way of being, which, in its widest manifestation, is indicative of ontological distinctiveness. The word ‘under-achievement’ is inappropriate in any cross-ontological context.

Acceptance of the achievement-under-achievement dichotomy in Aotearoa New Zealand education, and its concomitant association with culture, has produced many practical consequences. One current consequence is the belief that public policy ought to direct itself at the discrepancies between Māori and Pakeha in various tables of statistics. The political movement to ‘close the gaps’ between Pakeha and Māori levels of achievement is a manifestation of this view (Chapple, Jefferies, & Walker, 1997).

The online teachers came to accept the futility of teaching Māori within normalising education. They were led to this view by reflecting on ‘Heidegger’s Greeks’. The teachers came to see that their Māori students are in important ways like Heidegger’s Greeks - meaning, that they occupy an ontological space that is distinct, that they are developing their space according to the truths therein, and that their being as these beings is self-sufficient. Accordingly, it is unlikely Māori students will ever be adequately taught by a system built within normalising education because any such system occupies a different ontological space.

These ideas might develop into an argument for separate schooling for ontologically distinct beings. In the case of the Māori students, this would be another form of the argument for kura kaupapa Māori (schools that teach only in the Māori language and display Māori tikanga, as opposed to
mainstream Aotearoa New Zealand state schools). "World's come and go" says Young following Heidegger (Young, 2001, p. 19), but perhaps some worlds coexist and this is the base reason that education systems struggle with multiculturalism.

References


